Sunday, November 24, 2013

Richard Dawkins: British Wit or Upper-Class Twit?

Today the excellent radio show Skeptical Sunday, which airs on my radio home here in Ithaca, WRFI, broadcast a thought-provoking interview by philosopher Peter Boghossian with Richard Dawkins, Oxford prof and author of the best-selling and equally provocative book The God Delusion. Dawkins is a British wit and intellectual, cut from the same cloth as the journalist Christopher Hitchens, with a manner that does not gladly suffer fools and an imperiousness that is thankfully tempered by wry humor. 

These three men share a commitment to atheism and, somewhat paradoxically, are rather evangelical about it, each authoring widely read tomes denouncing all things religious.

Boghossian's conversation with Dawkins inevitably turned to Islam (on which Dawkins' comments have frequently proven controversial) and that's what I'm writing about today. Dawkin's discourse on the subject struck me at times as willful bordering on obtuse, and endangered him with metamorphosing from rapier wit to oblivious twit... And here's why.

Of course atheists, and for that matter Muslims, and anyone else, should be free to criticize Islam. But when you do so, understand that your words form part of a larger set of dialogues that have concrete implications -- and exercise caution to ensure that your words are not misunderstood. Do so not because you should be legally refrained from doing otherwise, but because you should value preventing this kind of misunderstanding for both analytical and ethical reasons. 

In the same way that people should be able to criticize the practices of the government of Israel without being perceived as anti-Semitic, criticism of Islamist practices should be allowed without being taken to be anti-Arab (which would be another form of anti-Semitism). In both cases, though, it is worthwhile to take care that your intentions are not misunderstood, because anti-Semitic and anti-Arab thinking continues to cause  harm in the world.

Dawkins' defense of his criticism of Islam dripped with self-righteousness as a truth-teller waging war against the plague of political correctness that blighted even his fellow non-believers. Liberal scholars so greatly feared accusations of racism, Dawkins declared, that they chose a weak-willed and deceitful political correctness over speaking truth to religion.

The tone of this colloquy recalled very similar kinds of salvos during the "culture wars" in the U.S., circa the 1980s and 1990s, when the term "political correctness" was coined. At the time, a coalition of the politically conservative and the academically conservative felt that intellectual space in the U.S., whether in universities or in public discourse, was being overtaken by representatives of all manner of minority groups who profited by playing up their historical oppression and parlayed victimhood into various kinds of advantages -- the "race card" was said to have been played to win everything from university admissions to criminal trials.

Again somewhat paradoxically, the decriers of politically-correct, race-card-wielding professional victims themselves claimed an oddly parallel kind of mental victimization, averring that to be called racist is horribly wounding. According to Dawkins in his interview with Boghossian, this fear is enough to cow his colleagues out of fighting injustice caused by Islam.

Here's my problem with this kind of disquisition -- it seems to assume that those who are combating racism or Islamophobia are attempting to act as some kind of thought police, and are concerned with the subjective states of mind of those they deem to be racist.

For me such claims entirely miss the point. Of course, it is hurtful to believe that people in your community, your society, your country, see you as less than human, as not deserving the understanding, compassion, or respect that they would accord themselves. But the greater harm lies not in words but in the actions that have been justified, both historically and today, by the sentiments contained in those words. The real harm lies in the structures of extreme inequity that were built, and that continue to survive, because of those sentiments. Think or say whatever you want about me -- but when you support institutional practices that unfairly exclude and harm me, then we have a problem and rightfully so.

Here's an example of what I mean: Back in the early 2000s, Dawkin's comrade Christopher Hitchens felt himself to be brave in exposing the oppressiveness of Muslim-majority societies in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as a consequence he blindly advocated ill-conceived warfare that has now bankrupted the U.S. economy, caused the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in those war-torn countries, and created enormous numbers of casualties for U.S. troops, including quite often their emotional trauma of having been called upon to execute an unjust war. 

Subsequently Hitchens eventually admitted that the Iraq war was disastrous, though he defended his initial support of it. But the point is that, in insisting on his right to decry Islam, he himself committed the ultimate scholarly sin -- a lack of analytical rigor in scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the actual declaration and prosecution of war.

See my point yet? Those who fan the flames of Islamophobia support, even if unintentionally, a politics of oppression - one that dehumanizes others and makes the justification of the unjustifiable much easier than it would be otherwise.

Similar controversies swirl around the use of the (tiresomely euphemized) "n" word. For me personally, the reason that, say, the "n" word is harmful isn't because of the state of mind of either the person who says it or the person who hears it. It's because of the historical and current injustices created by the mentality that also created that word. The "n" word signifies a person who is worthless, despicable and against whom any action can and should be taken with impunity. The lynchings that scarred this country happened because people were seen in this way. Anyone who has read or heard of, for example the extremely disturbing jokes about Trayvon Martin during and after George Zimmerman's acquittal for his killing must worry whether that strain of virulent, potentially violent racism persists. (By the way, I disagree with Ta-Nehisi Coates that black folks who urge each other not to use the word must be indulging in hypocritical "respectability politics"; in my opinion the reason not to use the word is that it reinforces internalized racism and self-hatred - it's less about seeming respectable to others and more about respecting yourself.)

To move from linguistic battles to tragically real ones is not always a stretch. Extrajudicial killing can be an expression of these extreme beliefs. And a tool of the current U.S. war on Muslim-majority countries, the armed drones, have posed a major subject of concern as a means of precisely that, according to a recent statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings.


No one should claim that the actual decision-makers on drones, in the White House or JSOC or wherever, harbor Islamophobic beliefs - there's hardly any way of proving that.  

But we should wonder whether totalizing depictions of Islam contribute to dehumanizing the populations that are so affected. I use the term "dehumanizing" because such generalizations don't permit the same nuances that we would intuitively understand for our own case - even critics of Christianity would hardly contest that a world of difference exists between various denominations, not to mention between theology and everyday life. 

For atheists, the underlying belief in a higher power is going to be misguided whatever its intensity, but the analytical slippage arises when the argument moves from criticizing the inherent logic of any religious faith, and towards characterizing a specific religious faith as necessarily entailing socially harmful practices.

So, yes, I do think it behooves critics of Islam to choose their words carefully in order to make sure they are not misunderstood as claiming, for example, that all Muslims are religious extremists or that Islam must be interpreted in a certain way. For these scholars who pride themselves on clarity of thought, the imperative to speak precisely should hardly be a bother. And it is not too much of a stretch to caution that, when wars are fought and civilians are subsequently killed on the implicit basis of such misperceptions, communicating with precision is not only a matter of scholastic pride but possibly of life or death.

Tuesday, November 5, 2013

My recent news-update post, at the excellent Interdisciplinary Project on Human Trafficking website led by Janie Chuang from American University, talks about the new human trafficking courts in NY state.

What to make of the growing anti-trafficking infrastructure? Without question, the vulnerability of people who either have been trafficked, or are susceptible, demands a sustained and effective policy response nationally and internationally. And yet I'm not sure that ramping up police enforcement activities is the way to do it. I worry that anti-trafficking initiatives legitimate a larger growth of the carceral, penal dimensions of government.  I worry about unintended consequences of a punitive approach.

Anti-trafficking policy is now divided into "prosecution, protection and prevention," and I'd much rather see more emphasis on the last two of those three goals. In particular, I'd support reforms in labor and immigration laws that reduce the vulnerability of people to trafficking in the first place. Along those lines, one danger of anti-trafficking as a high-visibility policy is that it may well be distracting attention from "ordinary" abusive migrant labor, even though the latter undoubtedly represents the more frequent occurrence.

The problem of trafficking is multifaceted and the solutions are equally so, and so I don't condemn anti-trafficking but rather would caution that it be applied with rigorous attention to the interests of the "victims," as opposed to those of the state or of law enforcement.

For example, I am critical of anti-trafficking laws that cause  victims to be repatriated to their home countries or, alternatively, required them testify against their traffickers in order to obtain residency in the US: either of these scenarios arguably amplify the victims' vulnerability.

I'll be discussing anti-trafficking law in an upcoming lecture for Cornell's International Law/ International Relations colloquium series; in 2006 I co-authored an article with Janet Halley, Hila Shamir and Prabha Kotiswaran in which I described the emergence of the current anti-trafficking framework and critiqued some of its "blind spots."


Monday, October 28, 2013

Legacies of Dred Scott? Citizenship, Social Meaning and the "Birthers"

Now that the film "12 Years a Slave" based on the 19th-century memoir has been released to critical acclaim and good box office returns, I wonder whether we'll see a bit more dialogue on how the present continues to shape the past, despite our much-pined-after ideal of post-racialism....


After all, that great political expert (OK not so much, but one could legitimately say the lauded (or larded!) pop-culture queen) Paula Deen informed us recently how her family mourned the loss of the "help" they had had on their antebellum plantation, and further opined that "it will take a long, long time" for "prejudice" to end. 

  
Another prime candidate for historical consciousness-raising in recent years has been the so-called "birther movement" -- the claim that U.S. President Barack Obama was not born in the United States. After Obama released the official long-form certificate recording his 1961 birth in Hawaii, birtherism initially spiked, but then, thankfully, declined rapidly among both the population at large and conservative Republicans, so that even amongst the latter only 16% held the birther view according to the last Washington Post poll I consulted on this.

My point about historical consciousness-raising isn't the need to dispute the birther claim on the facts, since the facts seem clear and the claim discredited -- but, rather, to gain historical awareness of how deeply that claim resounded the racialized past.

For example, only occasionally remarked upon during the birther kerfuffle was the striking resemblance of the birthers' arguments to the basic premise of the Dred Scott case, the infamous pre-Civil War opinion which found that persons of African descent could not claim U.S. citizenship. 

Justice Taney surely thought he was simply stating the obvious (I'd use the phrase "calling a spade a spade" but that probably wouldn't be good here!) in his reasoning:

"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing....

"The question before us is whether the class of persons described in the plea [viz., 'whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as slaves'] compose a portion of this people...? 

"We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." 
(60 U.S., at 404, emphasis added)

The 14th Amendment to the Constitution that followed the Civil War obviously reversed this point as a matter of law, but the question remains how much cultural residue of this earlier proclamation of the law of the land has stuck fast to the fabric out of which nation's politics are fashioned.

To quote that favored son of the South, William Faulkner

"The past is never dead. It's not even past." 

Getting back to blogging...






Phew, I've been away for quite awhile! Here's to getting back on track!



Stuff that has been published since 2011:



A chapter, "The Death of Doha? Forensics of Democratic Governance, DistributiveJustice, and Development in the WTO," in Chi Carmody, Frank Garcia, andJohn Linarelli eds.,GLOBAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONALECONOMIC LAW(CambridgeUniversity Press)(2012). This was originally given as a keynote address for one of the ASIL International Legal Theory Interest Group's meetings. The paper can be downloaded from SSRN and the whole book is also out with Cambridge UP.



Also, an introductory chapter to a volume of the World Bank Legal Review which I co-edited, on Legal Innovation and Empowerment...







... and lots of drafts on international migration at the moment, see the following posted on SSRN earlier this year:





and



....



Stay tuned for the magnum opus (or at least medium opus) on migration, hopefully in 2014...