I'm happy to report that my article, Law and Neoclassical Development in Theory and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, has been published by the Cornell Law Review. A copy can be found here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1844715.
This article contributed to a symposium on The Future of Legal Theory initiated by my colleague Jeff Rachlinski. My hope for the article was to investigate the role that economic theory, and in particular various stripes of neoclassical economic theory -- from neoclassical general equilibrium theory to the new institutional economics -- has played in shaping development policy related to legal reform.
Here is my abstract from the conference:
Institutionalism propounds a particular set of theoretical assumptions about the role of law in economic growth. In unpacking the development of those assumptions, this Essay adopts a model of intellectual history based on the Kuhnian argument that scientific knowledge evolves through key historical moments that establish theoretical paradigms. These paradigms are replaced only when awareness in the field of anomalies — problems that the existing theoretical paradigm cannot solve — presents a crisis for that paradigm that coincides with the emergence of an "alternate candidate."
The paradigm shift in law and development was enabled by dynamics in both the academy and the field. In the academy, the emergence of neoclassicism as an alternate candidate coincided with an internal intellectual crisis arising from the limitations of Keynesianism and, in development economics, statism. This shift was mirrored in the field by the emergence of neoclassicism as a political movement that engendered accompanying changes in the personnel and policy of the development institutions. As such, theory and practice in law and development were linked and mutually reinforcing in describing the arc from modernization to neoclassicism.
In adapting a historiographic method to its purposes, this Essay seeks to contribute to economic as well as legal histories of neoclassicism. In doing so, it seeks to specify how influential theories of law in development grew out of a highly idealized conceptual framework wedded to a particular economic policy agenda. Improving law and development discourse will require addressing the theoretical and practical particularities stemming from the field’s genealogical origins. In that spirit, this essay offers a critical intellectual history of the rise of neoclassical law and development in theory and practice.
Part I describes the origination and diffusion of neoclassical law and development from the academy to “the field.” Stemming from Coasian analysis of the relationship between institutional environment and microeconomic behavior, neoclassical law and development emerged out of the elaboration of that analysis into a series of prescriptions against macroeconomic governmental controls on trade and investment -- the “New Political Economy” (NPE) -- and for the establishment of legal institutions to enforce property rights and support commerce -- the “New Institutional Economics” (NIE). Bound up with Anglo-American political movements, the ideational constructs NPE and NIE “took power” when those movements did, as evidenced by the “rule of law revival” in development policy from the early 90s to the present day.
Part II evaluates the neoclassical law and development model in terms of its relationship to policy and empirical evidence. The thesis that institutional quality determines economic growth suffers from a series of troubling flaws. One problem is the analytical vagueness of the asserted causal relationship: how does institutional quality improve economic growth? The range of possible answers (enforcement of property rights, effective judiciary systems, democratic participation) impedes the formulation of effective development policy. Beyond this vagueness is the uncertainty that causality even exists: empirical studies have so far been unable to prove it. Finally, even if one could be confident that one knew what “institutional quality” meant, and confident that it would indeed cause economic growth, a number of issues apparently pervasive in the field of development policy – neoclassical or otherwise -- would still inhibit the success of any reform program: these problems include the manipulation of programming by entrenched interests in both the donor and beneficiary countries, the inability to design contextually responsive and informed programs in the face of the continued temptation to implement “one-size-fits-all” directives, and the lack of effective self-evaluation and long-term assessment in programming choices reducing prospects for improvement of development “knowledge” over time.
These impediments resemble the kinds of obstacles that the eminent institutional economist Douglass North would identify as transaction costs to institutional efficiency. The prolongation of law and development programs that are demonstrably ineffective (according to veterans of the field such as Thomas Carothers and Linn Hammergren) suggests precisely the kind of suboptimal path dependence that North identified as a barrier to economic growth in the developing world.
In other words, as Part III argues, there appears to be a need for an institutionalist analysis of “institutionalism” in the field of development. Although the neoclassical law and development policy matrix was intended to improve institutional quality in poor countries, it appears that the institutions of development policy themselves – the formal and informal “rules of the game” that shape organizational and individual behavior in the field - may need to be examined if the underlying project is to find success.
The paradigm shift in law and development was enabled by dynamics in both the academy and the field. In the academy, the emergence of neoclassicism as an alternate candidate coincided with an internal intellectual crisis arising from the limitations of Keynesianism and, in development economics, statism. This shift was mirrored in the field by the emergence of neoclassicism as a political movement that engendered accompanying changes in the personnel and policy of the development institutions. As such, theory and practice in law and development were linked and mutually reinforcing in describing the arc from modernization to neoclassicism.
In adapting a historiographic method to its purposes, this Essay seeks to contribute to economic as well as legal histories of neoclassicism. In doing so, it seeks to specify how influential theories of law in development grew out of a highly idealized conceptual framework wedded to a particular economic policy agenda. Improving law and development discourse will require addressing the theoretical and practical particularities stemming from the field’s genealogical origins. In that spirit, this essay offers a critical intellectual history of the rise of neoclassical law and development in theory and practice.
Part I describes the origination and diffusion of neoclassical law and development from the academy to “the field.” Stemming from Coasian analysis of the relationship between institutional environment and microeconomic behavior, neoclassical law and development emerged out of the elaboration of that analysis into a series of prescriptions against macroeconomic governmental controls on trade and investment -- the “New Political Economy” (NPE) -- and for the establishment of legal institutions to enforce property rights and support commerce -- the “New Institutional Economics” (NIE). Bound up with Anglo-American political movements, the ideational constructs NPE and NIE “took power” when those movements did, as evidenced by the “rule of law revival” in development policy from the early 90s to the present day.
Part II evaluates the neoclassical law and development model in terms of its relationship to policy and empirical evidence. The thesis that institutional quality determines economic growth suffers from a series of troubling flaws. One problem is the analytical vagueness of the asserted causal relationship: how does institutional quality improve economic growth? The range of possible answers (enforcement of property rights, effective judiciary systems, democratic participation) impedes the formulation of effective development policy. Beyond this vagueness is the uncertainty that causality even exists: empirical studies have so far been unable to prove it. Finally, even if one could be confident that one knew what “institutional quality” meant, and confident that it would indeed cause economic growth, a number of issues apparently pervasive in the field of development policy – neoclassical or otherwise -- would still inhibit the success of any reform program: these problems include the manipulation of programming by entrenched interests in both the donor and beneficiary countries, the inability to design contextually responsive and informed programs in the face of the continued temptation to implement “one-size-fits-all” directives, and the lack of effective self-evaluation and long-term assessment in programming choices reducing prospects for improvement of development “knowledge” over time.
These impediments resemble the kinds of obstacles that the eminent institutional economist Douglass North would identify as transaction costs to institutional efficiency. The prolongation of law and development programs that are demonstrably ineffective (according to veterans of the field such as Thomas Carothers and Linn Hammergren) suggests precisely the kind of suboptimal path dependence that North identified as a barrier to economic growth in the developing world.
In other words, as Part III argues, there appears to be a need for an institutionalist analysis of “institutionalism” in the field of development. Although the neoclassical law and development policy matrix was intended to improve institutional quality in poor countries, it appears that the institutions of development policy themselves – the formal and informal “rules of the game” that shape organizational and individual behavior in the field - may need to be examined if the underlying project is to find success.